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HOMICIDE-MALICE AFORETHOUGHT.
-[Florida] The deceased, one
Elbie Ellis, made a call upon the
defendant's daughter; the defend-
ant ordered his daughter into the
house as Ellis came walking up,
and as she went in, the deceased
followed her, swearing as he went.
The evidence shows without con-
tradiction that Ellis made an in-
decent proposal to the girl which
the father overheard, and he there-
upon ordered the young man out
of the house. When Ellis retorted,
"I won't get out until I get ready,"
the father shot him with a shotgun,
which he testifies (without any
substantial contradiction other than
the fact that no weapon was after-
ward found on the body of the de-
ceased) was used by him when he
noticed that the young man was
about to draw a pistol. The de-
fendant was tried and convicted of
second degree murder. The follow-
ing state statutory provisions were
considered as controlling: "The
unlawful killing of a human being,
when perpetrated from a premedi-
tated design to effect the death of
the person killed . . . shall be mur-
der in the first degree; . . . when
perpetrated by an act imminently
dangerous to another, and evincing
a depraved mind regardless of hu-
man life, although without any pre-
meditated design to effect the death
of any particular individual, it shall
be murder in the second degree."
Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) §7137.
"The offense of manslaughter em-
braces all killings which are neither
justifiable nor excusable homicide
nor murder." Fla. Comp. Laws
(1927) §7141. Held: on appeal, re-
versed. "The evidence failed to
establish in the accused that de-
pravity of mind essential to con-
viction of murder in the second de-
gree; . . . in the most unfavorable
view of the evidence against the
accused, he was at most guilty of a
reasonably provoked but unneces-
sary killing which, as a matter of
law, is no greater crime than that
of manslaughter": Ramsey v. State
(Fla. 1934) 154 So. 855.
In the popular sense malice has
come to imply hatred, revenge, ill-
will, or evil intent. As applied in
the field of criminal law, however,
the layman's definition would either
be inadequate or entirely erroneous.
Malice may be found, for example,
where there is no hatred or per-
sonal ill-will, as in cases involving
suicide pacts: Turner v. State
(1907) 119 Tenn. 663, 108 S. W.
1139; People v. Roberts (1920) 211
Mich. 187, 178 N. W. 690; or where
a mother kills her illegitimate off-
spring: Jones v. State (1860) 29
Ga. 594; or in cases of felony mur-
der, where the accused was an ac-
complice in the commission of a
felony, but took no part in the
[4541
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actual killing: People v. Peranio
(1923) 225 Mich. 125, 195 N. W.
670; or was even unaware that a
killing had occurred: State v. Car-
lino (1922) 98 N. J. L. 48, 118 Atl.
784; or in cases where third parties
are the innocent victims of the as-
sailant's attack: Carpis v. State
(1921) 27 N. M. 265, 199 P. 1012;
Honeycutt v. State (1900) 42 Tex.
Cr. App. 129, 57 S. W. 806; People
v. Cohen (1922) 305 Ill. 506, 137
N. E. 511. In the Cohen case the
defendant made an attack upon one
person, but unintentionally wounded
another instead. The indictment
charged assault with intent to kill
and murder the injured individual,
and the court gave an instruction
authorizing a verdict of guilty if
the jury found from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant with malice aforethought,
either express or implied, made an
assault with a deadly weapon upon
the first individual with intent to
kill and murder, even though it
would appear that there was no in-
tention to shoot the victim himself.
A conviction was affirmed. In cases
of felony murder, however, courts
exercise a discretion; the court said
in the case of Powers v. Common-
wealth (1901) 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.
W. 935, 63 S. W. 776: "Under our
statute the removal of a corner-
stone is punishable by a short term
in the penitentiary, and is therefore
a felony. If, in attempting this
offense, death were to result to one
conspirator by his fellow acciden-
tally dropping the stone upon him,
no Christian court would hesitate to
apply this limitation." The limita-
tion referred to is the reduction of
the offense to manslaughter, al-
though the killing occurred in the
commission of a felony.
The term "malice aforethought"
was used as early as 1200 A. D., and
certain cases wherein there was no
"malice aforethought" were par-
doned at that early date: 2 Pollock
and Maitland, "History of English
Law" (1895) 478; and the term
"malice prepensed" appears in the
statutes, 4 Hen. VIII, c. 2 (1512).
The earliest constructions placed
significance upon the time element,
i.e., the space for premeditation;
thus a case is reported wherein
"malice aforethought" is contrasted
with' "a sudden falling out :" 2 Pol-
lock and Maitland, op. cit. supra at
p. 484, n. 2. It may readily be ob-
served that this association of
"aforethought" with "premedita-
tion" was but confusing the defini-
tions of malice and intent, and this
confusion has prevailed until mod-
ern times in some jurisdictions; e.g.,
"Premeditation, or malice afore-
thought, is a necessary ingredient
to the crime of murder:" People v.
Erno (1925) 195 Cal. 272, 232 Pac.
710. None will deny the kinship of
malice and intent, but the growing
tendency is away from the defini-
tion of malice as an intent and
toward the "state of mind" aspect
of malice: Perkins, "Malice Afore-
thought," 43 Yale L. Jour. 537
(1934). Professor Perkins, refer-
ring to the legal aspects of negli-
gence and the variation from civil
negligence through criminal negli-
gence to that "greater than criminal
negligence," he says: "To express
this notion the courts have resorted
to such forms of expression as, 'an
act dangerous to others-done so
recklessly or wantonly as to evince
depravity of mind and a disregard
of human life,' State v. Capps
(1904) 134 N. C. 629, 46 S. E. 730;
'such cruel acts and conduct as in-
dicate a reckless disregard of hu-
man life,' State v. Collins (Del.
1903) 5 Penn. 263, 62 At. 224; 'an
intent to do any unlawful act which
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may probably result in depriving
the party of life,' Shorter v. State
(1922) 147 Tenn. 355, 247 S. W.
985; or 'an unlawful act, which in
its consequences naturally tends to
destroy the life .of a lhuman being,'
Ashford v. *State (1916) 144 Ga.
832, 88 S. E. 205."
It is well settled that malice
aforethought is not the produce of
premeditation; for example, a kill-
ing may be with malice afore-
thought although the design or in-
tent to kill was formed "at the very
moment the fatal shot was fired":
State v. Hall (1932) 54 Nev. 213,
13 P (2d) 624; or "on the spur of
the moment": State v. Heidelberg
(1908) 102 La. 300, 45 So. 256; but
then, too, premeditation can trans-
pire' as instantaneously as malice
aforethought, according to what
was said in Comnmonwealth v.
Dreher (1922) 274 Pa. 325, 118 Atl.
215: "An act is premeditated if
there was a previous deliberation
or a previous intent to kill, however
sudden and however quickly put
into execution; an instant of time
being sufficient." The decisions are
not unanimous, however, in distin-
guishing malice from intent. Pro-
fessor Perkins shows in his article
"Malice Aforethought," supra, how
courts have determined malice on
the existence or non-existence of
intent; quoting: "Express malice
aforethought has been said to mean
(assuming the absence of justifica-
tion or excuse or any mitigating
circumstances sufficient to reduce
the homicide to manslaughter) : (1)
an intent to kill the very person
killed, Ferell v. State (1875) 43
Tex. 503; (2) an intent to kill the
very person killed or to inflict great
bodily injury upon him, State v.
tFaino (Del. 1894) 1 Mary. 492, 41
AtI. 134; (3) an intent to kill some
person, People v. Cochran (1924)
313 Ill. 508, 145 N. E. 207; and (4)
an intent to cause the death or great
bodily injury to some person, Rex
v. Oneby (1727) 2 Ld. Raym. 1485,
1489, 92 Eng. Rep. R. 465; State v.
Brown (Del. 1902) 4 Penn. 120,
124, 53 At. 354, 355." Decisions
such as these incorporate intent in
the term malice; often statutes do
too. The Illinois statute, for ex-
ample, provides: "Express malice
is that deliberate intention unlaw-
fully to take away the life of a
fellow creature, which is mani-
fested by external circumstances
capable of proof." Ill. Rev. Stat.
(Smith-Hurd, 1933) C. 38, §358.
But in the light of modern aspects
of malice, it seems a more accurate
wording would be: "Express malice
accompanies . . ." or "is denoted
by that deliberate intention . . ."
The section relating to implied mal-
ice would not be open to this cor-
rection ("malice shall be implied
when no considerable provocation
appears, or when all the circum-
stances of the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart").
Professor Perkins' concluding defi-
nition of malice aforethought is "an
unjustifiable, inexcusable and unmi-
tigated man-endangering-state-of-
mind," which includes, he po 'ts
out: (1) intent to kill; (2) intent
to inflict great bodily injury, (3)
wanton and wilful disregard; (4)
perpetration of felony, and resist-
ing lawful arrest; that is, the wilful
doing of any act which involves a
subsequent element of human risk.
Significance has long attached to
this "man-endangering" or human
risk element as evidenced by stat-
utes which constitute murder of
those homicides occurring in the
perpetration of the commonly enu-
merated felonies of rape, robbery,
arson, and burglary.
Florida decisions have held that
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the statutory definitions of murder
do not make malice an element of
the offense, Riggins- v. State (1919)
78 Fla. 459, 83 So. 267; but that
premeditation is anq essential ele-
ment of that crime, Miller v. State
(1918) 75 Fla. 136, 77 So. 669. The
principal case holds that "malice in
law refers to that state of mind
which is reckless of law and of the
legal rights of the citizen in a per-
son's conduct toward that citizen,"
citing Colwel v. Tinker (1902) 169
N. Y. 531, 62 N. E. 668, 58 L. R. A.
765, 98 Am. St. Rep. 587; and later
Davis v. Hearst (1911)1 160 Cal.
143, 116 Pac. 530; but it is impor-
tant to note that these last two mem-
tioned cases are both civil suits,
the one an action for criminal con-
version, the other an action for
libel. Definitions of malice as they
occur in decisions handed down in
civil actions have little bearing on
the malice aforethought of the
criminal law, and reference to such
decisions by the courtsi sitting in
criminal cases should be made cau-
tiously. A holding in the case of
State v. Moynihan (1919) 93 N. J.
L. 253, 106 AtI. 817 is that "malice,
ir its legal sense, means nothing
more than an evil state of mind.
The premeditated and deliberate
design of a sane man to kill a hu-
man being, purposely executed with-
out adequate legal justification,
stamps the act as the result of an
*evil state of mind; hence, an act
conceived in malice. The law im-
plies malice from the commission
of the wrongful act."
Professor Perkins' "man-endan-
gering-state-of-mind" definition ap-
pears remarkably adequate, on a
study of the decisions; the state of
mind aspect seems indeed a more
accurate approach to the problem.
LAWRENCE B. MuRDocx.
ASSAULT wiTH INTENT TO KILL-
INTOXICATION AS A DMrENSF.-
[Oklahoma] The defendant while
in a state of partial intoxication
went to the residence of his tenant,
one Wilson, with whom he had had
some prior difficulty, and engaged
in a quarrel, which resulted in'
Wilson's being ordered to vacate the
premises within thirty days. As
Wilson started to leave, the defend-
ant shot at him three times, barely
missing him. The defendant was
prosecuted for assault with intent
to kill, and as a defense he claimed
to have been intoxicated to such
an extent that he was incapable of'
forming a specific intent. He was
convicted and sentenced to one year
in the penitentiary. Held: on ap-
peal, affirmed. The question of in-
toxication is one of fact to be de-
cided by the tri4 court (a jury
having been waived) and that court
had sufficient evidence before it to
find that the defendant was not in-
toxicated to a degree that would
render him incapable of forming an
intent. Weber v. State (Okla.
1934) 33 Pac. (2d) 232.
The state has the burden of prov-
ing every accusation made in the
indictment. Consequently, all
charges which include an "intent,"
such as assault with intent to kill,
assault with intent to rob, or as-
sault with intent to rape, etc., re-
qtdre thd prosecuting attorney to
prove an intent to commit the par-
ticular crime. In order to disprove
the presence of such a condition of
mind, an accused frequently de-
fends upon the ground of having
been in a mental lapse due to in-
toxication, drugs, or various mental
diseases. The degree to which a
defendant has become intoxicated,
is a matter to be decided by the
jury, as is the question of whether
the intoxication is so complete as
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to render him incapable of forming
a specific intent. State v. Massey
(1924) 20 Ala. App. 56, 100 So.
625. Intoxication as a defense may
be used when the charge is of any
crime in which the state bas the
burden of proving an intent. State
v. Johnson (Iowa, 1934) 245 N. W.
728. If the essential element is
lacking, namely intent, by reason
that the intoxication rendered the
assailant incapable of having an in-
tent, the criminal prosecution is
thereby defeated. This appears to
be the general rule, as it is well
substantiated in Weick v. Common-
wealth (1924) 201 Ky. 632, 258 S.
W. 90; People v. Neetens (1919)
42 Cal. App. 596, 184 Pac. 27; Peo-
ple v. Cochran (1924) 313 Ill. 508,
142 N. E. 207; Graham v. Common-
wealth (1923) 200 Ky. 161, 252 S.
W. 1012. However, drunkenness
cannot be a successful defense in
a case of assault with intent to rape.
State v. Comer (1922) 296 Mo. 1,
247 S. W. 179. The crime of as-
sault with intent to commit rape
appears to be an exception to the
rule because of its nature being
such that a man could not attempt
to commit the act without having
a desire to do so; the matter of in-
tent being liberally construed by the
court.
Although intoxication may be
such as to preclude the possibility
of there being a specific intent, the
defense in certain cases may be
held unavailable on the ground that
the defendant has voluntarily put
himself in that condition. In State
v. Jordon (1920) 285 Mo. 62, 225
S. W. 905, involving the crime of
assault with intent to kill, the court
was willing to supply intent by con-
struction, giving as a reason the
well recognized principle that "one
who voluntarily assumes an attitude
likely to produce harm to others,
despite any specific intention to in-
jure, is responsible for the conse-
quences of his act." (2 Coke, Litt.
sec. 247a).
The Illinois Supreme Court cor-
rectly states the general view in
People v. Brislane (1920) 295 111.
241, 129 N. E. 185, that if the de-
fendant at the time of the commis-
sion of the crime charged, was
wholly incapable of forming an in-
tent, whether from intoxication or
any other causes, he is guilty of no
crime. This rule was supported by
Crosby v. People (1891) 137 Ill.
325, 27 N. E. 49; Schwabacker v.
People (1897) 165 111. 618, 46 N. E.
809; Bruen v. People (1903) 206
Ill. 417, 69 N. E. 24; People v.
Jones (1914) 263 Ill. 564, 105 N.
E. 744.
FRANKLIN B. WITTER.
PRESENCE OF AccuSED DURING
PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS. - [Mis-
sissippi] The defendant was in-
dicted for murder. His attorney,
before the setting of trial date,
moved for a special venire and the
order was entered. When the case
came to trial, the attorney made a
motion to quash the special venire
on the ground that the defendant
was not present when the order was
entered. There was a conflict of
evidence as to whether the defend-
ant was present, but the motion was
denied and an exception was taken.
Held: on appeal, affirmed. Even if
the defendant were absent it was
not a denial of his constitutional
right to be present during his trial
since the absence occurred at a pre-
liminary proceeding: Ford v. State
(Miss. 1934) 155 So. 220.
This case is the latest in a line
of decisions that are apparently
unanimous in holding that absence
from a preliminary proceeding is
CRIMINAL CASES 459
not prejudicial to a defendant:
Mabry v. State (1888) 50 Ark. 492,
8 S. W. 823; Milton v. State (1902)
134 Ala. 42, 32 So. 653; Vogel v.
State (1908) 138 Wis. 315, 119 N.
W. 180; Oliver v. State (1913) 70
Tex. Crim. App. 140, 159 S. W.
235; Ammons v. State (1913) 65
Fla. 166, 61 So. 496; Logan v.
Stale (1915) 131 Tenn. 75, 173 S.
Wj 443; Benton v. State (1928)
108 Tex. Crim. App. 285, 300 S.
W. 75. The reasons assigned for
the immateriality are similar in the
various jurisdictions. In Logan v.
State, supra, it was said that such
an order constituted an administra-
tive duty with which the defendant
had no concern. In Milton v. State,
supra, it was called "ministerial,"
while in Mabry v. State, supra, the
court said it formed no part of the
trial.
The rule enunciated in the in-
stant case seems to be the only
sensible one to apply. There is a
growing tendency throughout the
country not to disturb jury verdicts
in criminal cases on technicalities
which occasion no substantial harm
to the defendant. The error com-
plained of in the principal case is
harmless and certainly should not
be made the basis of a reversal and
a new trial which would cost the
state money and at the same time
serve no useful purpose.
GERALD F. WHITE.
TESTITMONY OF ACCOMPLICES -
DISQUALIFIC.ATION BY APPROVE-
MEXT.-[Florida] The defendant
and four other persons were jointly
indicted for murder and found
guilty. The defendant appealed,
one assignment of error being that
two of his co-defendants who ap-
peared as the state's witnesses
were "approvers" and therefore dis-
qualified to testify, since a Florida
statute provided that "approvers
shall not be admitted in any case
whatever." (Fla. Comp. Laws,
1927, §8381.) Although the trial
court's verdict was reversed on
other grounds, the appellate court
decided, upon this issue, that the
abolition of this ancient practice of
approvement did not disqualify the
co-defendants as witnesses since
they are not considered "approvers"
within the common law meaning of
that term. Lee v. State (Fla. 1934)
155 So. 123.
Blackstone states that approve-
ment occurs "when a person in-
dicted of treason or felony, and ar-
raigned for the same, doth confess
the fact before plea pleaded: and
appeals or accuses others, his ac-
complicesA in order to obtain his
pardon." The party appealed or
accused is called the appellee, and
the party accusing the approver.
4 BI. Com. (15th Ed., 1809) 330.
A successful approver was entitled
to his pardon as of right.
A prisoner could be allowed by
the court to be an approver only
when he had in fact committed a
capital offense, either treason Gr
felony, and had pleaded guilty. If
so allowed the prisoner took an oath
in court to discover all crimes of
felony or treason that were com-
mitted by the .approver in company
with the appellee. A coroner was
appointed by the court to take the
approver's appeal which was equiv-
alent to an indictment. 2 Hawki:s,
Pleas of the Crown" (1788) 296.
The 'law held approvers up to a
high standard of honesty. and in-
tegrity, and the penalty for any mis-
statement in the appeal or act show-
ing a lack of good faith was hang-
ing. If the approver claimed -that
the appeal was made by duress, the
coroner was examined under oath
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concerning the claim, and if the
coroner affirmed that it was made
of the approver's own free will, the
approver was executed. The cor-
oner put the appeal in writing when
the approver first recited it, and
some days later the approver was
made to repeat it word for word
in court. If a mistake was made in
a single detail the court considered
that the appeal was falsified, and
hanged the approver forthwith. A
like penalty was inflicted if the ap-
prover appealed against someone
not found in the kingdom, but proc-
ess of outlawry issued against the
appellee regardless of the execution
of the approver. 2 Hale, "Pleas of
the Crown" (1778) 234. If the
accused once plead not guilty he
could not be an approver, for if he
changed his plea to guilty and asked
to be sworn as an approver it was
obvious to the court that he had,
told a falsehood as his confession
contradicted his former plea."
Hawkins, op. cit. supra at p. 295.
It was entirely discretionary with
the court whether a prisoner should
be allowed to be sworn as an ap-
prover and if it appeared that he
was a principal and tempted the
others the court would reject him
as an approver. Rex v. Rudd (1775)
1 Cowp. 331, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 1114.
The appellee was allowed to take
his exceptions to the sufficiency of
the appeal. Grounds for such ex-
ceptions were: that the approver
was not in prison but at large; that
the approver was over seventy years
of age, or a woman, or maimed,
whereby appellee would be deprived
of his right to trial by battle; or
that the approver was already out-
lawed because of another felony. 2
Hale, op. cit. supra at p. 233. An
appellee could not, however, himself
become an approver "not only be-
cause it would falsify the appeal of
the first approver in supposing that
he had omitted some of his partners,
but also because it would cause him
an indefinite delay: -for the appellee
of such an approver might as well
become an approver of others, and
so on." 2 Hawkins, op. cit. supra
at p. 295.
If the appellee did not take ex-
ception to the appeal, but pleaded
to the felony, he could put himself
on trial either by battle or by the
country. If trial by battle were
chosen and the appellee vanquished
the approver, the appellee was set
free and the approver hanged, but
if the approver prevailed, the ap-
pellee was held for the crime and
the approver was entitled to a par-
don as of right. If an approver
should appeal several persons it
was necessary for him to vanquish
them all before he could demand
his pardon. 2 Hale, op. cit. supra
at p. 233.
If the appellee elected to stand
trial, the approver was sworn as a
witness, and Lord Hale points out
that although he is a confessed
felon, yet his testimony against the
appellee gains a "probable credi-
bility" because "he accuseth him-
self by his confession." Ibid. The
approver's testimony or evidence is
not conclusive, as the credibility of
the witness was, then as now, a
matter for the determination of the
jury.
By the beginning of the 16th cen-
tury the practice of approvement
had fallen into disuse because it was
found that more harm came to in-
nocent men as a result of false ac-
cusations of villains than benefit to
the public by discovery and convic-
tion of real criminals. 2 Hate, op.
cit. supra at p. 226. In the leading
case of Rex v. Rudd, supra, Lord
Mansfield said that approvement
was one method by which an accom-
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plice could acquire a right to a par-
don, but that, while approvement
was still a part of the common law,
the practice by long discontinuance
had grown into disuse. He distin-
guished this old practice of approve-
ment under which the approver had
a legal right to a pardon from the
practice of turning evidence for the
Crown. In the latter case, he points
out, if the accused acts fairly and
openly, and discovers the whole
truth, though he is not entitled of
right to a pardon, yet the usage of
the courts is to suspend prosecu-
tion against him, and he has an
equitable title to a recommendation
for the King's mercy. But he is
not entitled to this exemption from
prosecution as a matter of right:
Rex v. Brunton (1821) Russ. & Ry.
454, 168 Eng. Rep. R. 894; Ex
Parte Wells (1855) 18 How. 307.
This rule has always been followed
in the United States: United States
v. Ford (1878) 99 U. S. 594. In
the Ford case the court, in holding
that a district attorney has no au-
thority to contract that a person ac-
cused of an offense against the
United States shall not be prose-
cuted if, when examined as a wit-
ness against his accomplices, he
fully discloses his and their guilt,
said that the usage of not prosecut-
•ing an accomplice who has fully
testified against his associates in
guilt had its origin in the ancient
practice of approvement.
The old Illinois Code, like the
present Florida Code, declares that
approvers shall not be allowed to
give testimony: §17, Scates' Comp.
337 (1858). The courts at first
made no distinction between an ac-
complice and an approver, but the
Supreme court in Stevens v. People
(1905) 215 Ill. 593, 74 N. E. 786,
said: "More recently the courts
have come to recognize the public
necessity of admitting such evi-
dence in order that criminals may
be brought to justice." .In the in-
stant case the Florida court made
a sharp distinction between accom-
plices and approvers on the ground
that the alleged approvers had ful-
filled relatively few of the old com-
mon law requirements of an
approver.
DAvD B. RicHARnsox.
DOUBLE JEOPARDy - ADULTERY -
LEWDNESS.-[Wisconsin] The de-
fendant, having lived with a woman
not his wife for a period of about
one Year, was convicted on a
charge of lewd and lascivious con-
duct under a Wisconsin statute (St.
1933, No. 351.04). When, follow-
ing service of sentence, it was
learned that the defendant was a
married man, a warrant issued
charging him with having com-
mitted the crime of adultery in vio-
lation of statute (Wis. St. 1933,
No. 351.01). The defendant con-
tended that the act with which he
was originally charged was a con-
tinuous offense made so by a series
of acts creating but one offense
within the meaning of the stat.itc
under which he had already been
convicted and punished. The de-
fendant therefore claimed that his
prior conviction precluded a prose-
cution for adultery on the grounds
of a former jeopardy for the of-
fense committed. On the trial for
adultery, the following question was
certified to the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin for settlement: did the
conviction of the defendant in the
district court for lewd and lasciv-
ious conduct constitute a bar to the
prosecution for adultery in the
municipal court, where the evidence
produced in the secondb trial was
the same as that brought forward
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in first except for additional proof
of the defendant being a married
man. The court held -that prior
conviction was nQt a bar and that
no double jeopardy right would be
violated, for offenses are not the
same when there are distinct ele-
ments in one which are not included
in the other, even though both re-
late to one transaction: State, v.
Brooks (Wis. 1934) 254 N. W. 374.
Cases are not infrequent where
different offenses are committed in
the same transaction or trans-
actions and it is generally held
that the rule that a person
cannot twice be tried or put in
jeopardy for the same offense has
no application where two separate
and distinct crimes are committed
by one and the same act. Thus an
acquittal on a charge of arson does
not bar a prosecution for burning
goods to injure an insurance com-
pany, People v. Fox (1915) 269 Ill.
300, 110 N. E. 29; a conviction for
an assault with a deadly weapon,
with intent to commit murder, is
not a bar to a subsequent prosecu-
tion for an attempt to commit rob-
bery, People v. Bentley (1888) 77
Cal. 7, 18 Pac. 799; a conviction for
assault and battery will be no bar
to a trial for manslaughter, where
the injuries result in death after the
former conviction, State v. Little-
field (1880) 70 Me. 452; conviction
for disturbing the peace by loud and
vociferous language does not bar a
conviction for assault by use of a
gun in an angry, threatening man-
ner, Clayton v. State (1917) 81
Tex. Cr. 385, 197 S. W. 591; con-
viction for an assault with intent
to rape forms no bar to a prosecu-
tion for lewd, immoral, and lasciv-
ious acts with a child, State v.
Jacobson (1924) 197 Iowa 547, 197
N. W. 638; also in England, a con-
viction for sodomy was held not to
prevent a prosecution on a charge
of gross indecency, The King v.
Barron (1914) 2 K. B. 570. It
may therefore be stated that as a
general rule, where two offenses
grow out of the same transaction
and are severable and distinct,
prosecution for one offense result-
ing in either a conviction or an ac-
quittal will not bar prosecution for
the other offense.
In the instant case therefore the
problem becomes one of differen-
tiating between the statutory crimes
of adultery and lewdness, the lewd-
ness in question being that lewd
and lascivious conduct involved in
illicit cohabitation. The question is
whether or not the crimes coincide,
or not doing so, what additional
evidence is necessary for proof of
the one crime after a trial has been
had for the other. There are four
elements in which the two crimes
are totally different and easily dis-
tinguishable. In the first element,
that of public policy, the two
crimes are not the same. Lewd and
lascivious behavior is a defiance of
the usual conventions recognized in
our laws as standards of decency.
It is sought by law to prevent acts
detrimental to the morals of the
community. However in the mat-
ter of adultery, the offense is a
transgression against the marriage
relation, which relation the law
seeks to protect. Although both
mightg be classed as questions of
public policy, they are different,
lewd and lascivious conduct being
a violation to the entire field of
public morals whereas a single act
of adultery is damaging in the main
only to the offender's marital rela-
tionship.
Ini the second element, that of
continuity of offense, the two
crimes differ materially. Lewdness
constitutes a continuing offense,
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coupled with the willful creation of
a bad reputation for the parties in-
volved. Where lewd and lascivious
conduct is charged, the evidence
necessary to support a prosecution
must be something more than that
of a single act of fornication or
adultery, or even of several such
acts where disconnected and secret.
2 Wharton, "Criminal Law" (12th
ed. 1932) sec. 2109. However,
where the crime of adultery has
been charged against the offender,
it is generally held that a single act
of intercourse between one married
person and another, makes that
married person liable to prosecu-
tion. In' a majority of states,
adultery is held not to be a con-
tinuing offense, but each act of
adultery constitutes a separate of-
fense. 2 C. J. 13.
In two other elements also, tne
crimes may be noted to possess sub-
stantial differences. Under most
statutes, it is an essential element
of the offense of lewdness that the
cohabitation involved be open and
notorious, People v. Stern (1918)
207 Ill. App. 154; Commonwealth
v. Munson (1879) 127 Mass. 459;
Jamison v. State (1906) 117 Tenn.
58, 94 S. W. 675. On the other
hand no notoriety is attached to
adultery, only proof of marriage
and the act or acts of intercourse
need be given. 2 Wharton, "Crim-
inal Law" (12th ed. 1932) sec. 2095,
2096. A fourth element is that of
marriage. To the charge of adul-
tery, a claim of non-marriage would
be a defense while in a prosecution
for lewdness, the problem of mar-
riage is immaterial and of no con-
sequence except as bearing on
subsequent charges.
Even though these several ma-
terial differences exist, proof of un-
lawful intercourse is necessary for
conviction in each criminal charge.
However complete proof might be
of a charge of lewdness, it would
not be sufficient to warrant a con-
viction for a subsequent charge of
adultery without the additional
proof, of the defendant's marriage.
The problem of justice in so pun-
ishing an offender for two distinct
offenses growing out of the same
act is a perplexing one and should
be left to the discretion of the trial
judge. The defendant, having com-
mitted two crimes by a single act,
must stand or fall by his separate
defenses.
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